In line with the rational expectations' approach, economists emphasize transparency as a key factor for Central Banks' credibility. In this paper, a psychological approach yields different results: trust in the Banks' policy is associated with the professionalism and independence of the Bank and not with its transparency. It is a subtle difference: transparency is indeed a positive factor in the overall perception of the Bank as trustworthy, but a statistical analysis shows that not all aspects of perception are relevant to trust in the Bank's credibility in its inflationary policy.
Introduction
Central Banks cannot function in the absence of trust. Other branches of the government need trust too, but for the CB it is crucial because trust has replaced the gold standard as the anchor of the world's monetary system. Following the demise of the Bretton Woods monetary regime, price stability is dependent upon the fiscal and monetary policy of the government, and the trust in those policies experienced by economic agents. In essence, it consists of the belief that the CB is in control of the money supply, and that current monetary policy is adequate for maintaining price stability.
1 The recent proliferation of inflation targeting regimes (Fouejieu & Roger, 2013 , Salle 2013 formalizes this trust through the attempt to influence the public inflationary expectations. The CB has a formal or informal inflation target, most often around two percent per year, which attempts to anchor inflationary expectations.
Israel is a fine example of the success of inflation targeting: it managed to complete its disinflation process, starting at a hyper-inflation rate of 445% in 1984, going through around 10% in the 1990's and its current inflation rate is in the low one-digit range.
This success hinges upon the ability of the Bank of Israel to persuade the public that it adheres to its inflation target -between 1 and 3 percent per year, even though it often missed it 2 . The anchoring of inflationary expectations is important per se, but it also allows the Bank to pursue anti-cyclical monetary policy: easing the money supply in times of economic slow-down. If the inflationary expectations are firmly anchored, the public does not interpret this move as a signal that inflation is returning, but rather as a real increase in the money supply and credit.
The acquired reputation of the CB is a solution to the well-known "time inconsistency problem" introduced by Prescott and Kydland: policymakers sometimes have an incentive to say one thing, but later do something else. One solution is for policymakers to develop a reputation for credibility, and recognize that the long-term benefits of having a reputation for reliability exceed the short-run costs involved (Gomme, 2006 , Rogoff, 1985 ).
Central Bank credibility means price and wage setters will be more willing to exercise restraint if they believe the Central Bank is firmly committed to price stability (Krugman, 2012) . A high level of Central Bank credibility should lead to various economic advantages such as less costly disinflation -when the Bank operates to lower inflation rates. It also prevents random shocks in prices and causes less fluctuation in inflationary expectations (Herrendorf & Lockwood, 1997) . Further, it enables the Bank to make tactical changes in monetary policy without inducing fear in the financial markets. Lastly, even when the Bank acts as lender of last resort or has to protect the local currency against speculators, the required policies won't necessarily lead to an increase in inflationary expectations provided the Bank enjoys a good reputation (Blinder, 2000) .
The above explains why efforts to attain and measure credibility are valuable.
Notions like "credibility" -which, like most abstract concepts, are somewhat nebulous -must be defined precisely (Gomme, 2006) . Very often, credibility is measured by the difference between medium/long term public expectations regarding the Bank's target and the target itself. Since public expectations about inflation constitute one of the key factors that determine actual inflation, the interest of the Bank in this measure is clear. However, this measure is not a clean indicator of the basic credibility of the Bank, the basis of the inflation targeting regime. This is because inflationary expectations are a combination of the analysis of economic conditions together with the Bank's powers and intentions. The measure which we develop in this paper is designed to gauge the latter only: how people view the ability and intentions of the Bank.
We measured the credibility of the Bank by asking respondents how much confidence they have in the Bank's inflationary forecasts and also growth forecasts. We then combine these measures with perceptions of laypeople regarding the Bank, in order to determine what creates the Bank's credibility in the public eye?
The Bank of Israel's forecasts are made by the Bank's Research Department and its reports are published twice a year (Bank of Israel, Inflation Report 2011). We chose this item because the Bank places much emphasis on these forecasts. It makes an effort to convince the public that their forecasts are objective and reliable, by detailing the procedure and the models underlying them. The forecasts are one of the tools that the Bank uses to convince the public that it is serious about its commitment to control inflation and to confine it within its target. While our measure of credibility is tightly linked to the inflation forecasts, it focuses on the confidence that the public has in the Banks' forecasting abilities, rather than in the outcome of its actions.
In an attempt to determine what factors affect a Central Bank's credibility, Blinder (2000) asked 84 Central Bank governors to rate the variables that make a Central Bank credible. "A history of living up to its word" and "independence from the political system" were found to be the most important factors (with no significant difference between them). A history of fighting inflation and transparency followed, in terms of importance (again, no significant difference between them), while low fiscal deficit, clear rules and incentives to the Bank's governor ranked last.
However, the governors' views do not necessarily represent those of the public at large. Indeed, this would be unlikely, as their position and experience endows them with a thoroughly atypical perspective. It is important to study the attitudes of laypeople, since they are those who by their economic behavior affect prices through expectations. Expectations regarding future prices affect today's purchases, that in turn affect today's prices, and this means that laypeople's expectations regarding prices are critical for the control of inflation (Gaffeo and Canzian, 2011) . Due to the complexity of causal relations in economics, it seems doubtful that the public grasps the nature of the Central Banks' actions and their purpose, and indeed, it may well fail to understand the very function of Central Banks. As Arthur (2000) stresses, economics is inherently difficult. Professional arguments relating to the Central Bank's credibility are exceedingly technical. If the public tries to evaluate its activity, it must perforce impose some simpler structure and rely on heuristics (Leiser & Aroch, 2009 ) to decide how much credence to give to the Bank's pronouncements.
Much is already known about what may happen when comprehension is challenged. Psychologists distinguish two modes of mental functioning, and these maps onto two qualities of trust: trust based on either cognitive-rational processes or on automatic-affective ones (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010; Gangl, Kastlunger, Kirchler, & Voracek, 2012) . The differentiation in cognitive-rational and automatic-affective trust echoes a distinction made in various theoretical and empirical contexts, such as the dual models of Darlow & Sloman, (2010) ; Epstein & Pacini, (1999) , or the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986 ) and the Heuristic Systematic
Model (Chen & Chaiken, 1999) , both of which describe persuasion and attitude change.
We draw on Castelfranchi and Falcone's (2010) conceptualization of trust, and differentiate between reason-based and implicit trust. Reason-based trust represents the result of a rational argumentative decision (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010) . For our purposes, we will focus on the two main factors affecting the decision. The trustor evaluates the other's competence and willingness regarding the successful achievement of a specific goal. Competence means that the other is perceived as being capable of successfully achieving a certain goal. Willingness results from the assessment of the other's motivation, intention, and persistence to achieve a specific goal. The rational evaluation of these components combined with the costs benefits and dangers involved determine the degree of reason-based trust.
Reason-based trust therefore corresponds to trust definitions assuming a rational agent who trusts the other if it can be expected that he will forgo opportunistic goals (Coleman, 1994) . As we noted above, this is precisely what the reputation of a CB relies on to achieve its goal despite the "time inconsistency problem". By contrast, implicit trust is defined as an automatic, unintentional, and unconscious reaction to stimuli (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010) . The automatic reaction originates from associative and conditioned learning processes and memory. It is related to social trust (Welch et al., 2005) and to affective trust, as conceptualized by Jones (1996) . Both qualities of trust, reason-based trust and implicit trust, are relevant to the perception of the Central Bank. One purpose of this study is to evaluate the relative importance of the two sets of processes (the reason-based and the implicit factors) in the evaluation of the CB's credibility.
Method
Using social networks, emails, forums, and content sites, we publicized an online questionnaire that contained three sets of questions: (1) demographics; (2) questions measuring the judged credibility in the economic predictions of the Central Bank of Israel, as compared to other major economic institutions; and (3) questions regarding the respondents' assessment of the Central Bank's performance.
Data collection was concentrated in the period between May 16 and July 14 2011.
During this period, the most prominent global economic features were the continued decline in global markets and further deterioration of the European debt crisis.
Meanwhile, Israel's economy experienced continued growth, leading to the strengthening of the Shekel (the local currency) against the USD, as well as a continued rise in housing prices. The Inflation rate (12 months ended July) was 4.1%, higher than the upper limit of the inflation target (3%), while inflationary expectations derived from markets stood at 2.9% (Bank of Israel interest press release, July 2011).
Materials
Our online questionnaire was comprised of four sections and constructed in a way that its average time of completion would not exceed 8-9 minutes. Therefore, the number of questions was kept small. Its sections were as follows: In the first, an overview of the task was given to participants and it was emphasized that filling in the questionnaire is voluntary; respondents could leave the questionnaire at any stage and information given by them would strictly be kept in confidence. The second section collected sociodemographic information.
In the third section, our operational goal was the extent to which our survey respondents believed that the Bank's forecasts will materialize. Each respondent rated, on a nine point scale (ranging from 1='Definitely not' to 9='Definitely'), the level of trust they give to the forecasts on inflation and economic growth of the CB. We then compared them to the forecasts of five major economic institutions which we used as reference. For each institution, we used the indicator it is most identified with, in the same way that CB are associated with inflation and growth forecasts. The five institutions are (1) Bank Hapoalim, the largest commercial bank in Israel, (2) The last section measured respondents' perceptions regarding the Bank.
Respondents rated, on a six point scale (1='Not at all' to 6='Very much'), the extent of their agreement with fifteen statements regarding the Bank of Israel. Some of the statements were formulated as positive, others as negative. Two additional statements were formulated as "semantic differential" scales -a method in which participants are asked to declare their positions regarding a phrase on a scale between two bipolar adjectives, as for example: "The Bank of Israel is a political/ professional institution".
In general, all statements were relevant to the role and reputation of the Central Bank.
Questions were adapted from statements used by Vigoda (2000; Vigoda and Mizrahi, 2010) , who studied public trust in the Israeli public sector, to which we added questions about topics not covered by them and required for our study. The order of the questions in each section was modified randomly for each participant, to control for order effects. Table 1 presents all the statements dealing with preferences, functions and performance of the Bank as a fair, transparent, independent, professional and trustworthy institution.
<Table 1: Statements and encoding>

Participants
When publicizing the questionnaire, we endeavored to reach all socio-economic levels of the Israeli population, with a wide range of age, professions and educational level. The distribution procedure yielded 1083 responses, of which 50% (542) completed the questionnaire. We excluded partially filled questionnaires and questionnaires filled in by respondents with an academic degree in economics, leaving us with laypeople only. We further excluded forms bereft of variance (e.g. all answers
were rated 6) as indicating respondents who were only interested in glancing the questions or to reach its end. The final sample consists of 481 respondents (mean age = 39.9, SD = 13.7), of which 249 were female and 232 male, who had no (288) or little (193) formal training in economics. Among the respondents, 98 had no college education, 274 were undergraduates and 168 were studying for or had completed their graduate studies. When asked to rate their socio-economic status, 74 respondents perceived themselves as having a lower than average income; 288 as average income and 180 respondents as above average income. In terms of occupational status, 327
were salaried employees, and 92 independently employed. Regarding the level of exposure to the economic media: 111 reported "rarely exposed", 247 reported "sometimes" and 122 reported "often". As for the nature of their employment, we dichotomized the responses: 109 were classified as managers (either independently employed or supervising at least four employees) all other 372 participants were classified as employees. Lastly, the mean answer to the question "to what extent do you feel that the Bank of Israel's actions impacts your life" was 6.17 (SD=1.91) on a scale of 1-9 (1=very low, 9 very high impact).
Results
Analysis of the questionnaires was conducted in a straightforward manner. First, we examined the level of trust in the Bank's predictions compared to that in other economic institutions. Next, we examined perceptions regarding the Bank's performance. Lastly, we combined these two parts, using a regression and mediation analysis, to examine the correlation between perceptions regarding the Central Bank of
Israel and the level of trust in its predictions.
Measuring trust in the Bank's predictions
Overall, the mean trust given to predictions of all the economic institutions about which we asked was 5.31 (SD=1.66) on a scale of 1-9 (1=definitely not to 9=definitely).
This average is slightly higher than the center of the scale. An ANOVA analysis with repeated measurements showed that not all forecasts are equally trusted F (6, 2880) =82.89, p<0.0001, η^2=.14. 
Aspects of perceptions regarding the Bank of Israel <Table 2: PCA results>
We extracted the main aspects of public perceptions by conducting Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) -a method for dimensionality reduction aimed at extracting the fundamental structure of a set of variables. We ran PCA on the scores on the 13 statements regarding the Bank of Israel (see Table 2 ). Results were tested by a variety of methods, with and without rotation. We present here the findings with the simplest orthogonal rotation -Varimax raw method. This method maximizes the variances of the squared raw factor loadings across variables for each factor, thus isolating distinct factors. We excluded those statements which directly deal with perceiving the Bank as trustworthy (statements 1-3 and 5) for reasons that will become clear presently. This procedure yielded three underlying factors 3 that jointly account for 59.43% of the total variance.
A. Factor 1: Professionalism. Professionalism accounts for 24% of the variance and regroups four statements. Underlying these is the perception of the CB as a professional rather than a political institution, an aspect crucial to the Central Bank's independence.
B. Factor 2: Transparency. Transparency accounts for 14% of the variance and regroups two statements. The common underlying notion is the transparency of the Bank of Israel -of its decisions, as opposed to its considerations in making those decisions.
C. Factor 3: Social awareness and Innovation. This factor accounts for 21% of the variance and also regroups two statements, relating to a positive image of the CB as innovative and socially aware, without reference to its official role in the economy.
The relationship between perceptions and credibility
In order to estimate the relative influence of these factors on shaping the public perception of the Bank, statements loaded with 0.7 and above were grouped into three new indices (Professionalism, Transparency, and Social awareness and Innovation) by averaging the scores of the component questions. These indices do correlate with each other (see Table 3 ). This may be expected from the so-called halo effect, a type of cognitive bias in which one's overall impression of a person or an institution influences in return how one evaluates individual components related to that impression. In addition, we devised another index, General Trust; by averaging the scores of three 3 We did not include factors with eigenvalue < 1 statements in the questionnaire that directly deal with the Bank as trustworthy (statements 1, 2 and 5). Table 4 ). The patterns of the two analyses are very similar, and only two of the predictors proved significant: there is a positive relationship between perceiving the Bank as a professional institution (competent and a-political) and as Influential, and the credibility of its predictions (see Table 5 Table 7 ), and then without it (see Table 5 ). When General Trust is added to the equation F(5,475) 4 The higher unstandardized coefficient in the first regression stems from the high correlation between trust in BI's predictions and those of the other institutions.
=19.165, R 2 adj. =0.159; F (5,475) =5.23, R 2 adj. =0.042, Professionalism no longer has a significant effect on credibility (See Table 7 ).
These findings are schematized in Figure 1 : General Trust mediates the effect of Professionalism on the credibility of the CB's predictions, whereas Influence is an independent factor. The other two factors, Transparency and Social awareness and Innovation are not involved. affect General Trust, have no effect on credibility (CBCA).
< Tables 6a & 6b: Effects of perceived general trust on trust in CB's predictions > <
Conceptually, the meaning of these findings may be explicated with reference to the two dimensions of trust presented in the introduction (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010) : reason-based and implicit trust. As mentioned, the halo effect yields correlations between Professionalism, Social awareness and Innovation and Transparency, they all contribute to a positive feeling and General trust in the Bank. This is a manifestation of implicit trust, an associative and unanalyzed reaction to the Bank. However, when it comes to decide whether to trust the CB's predictions, the respondents evinced reasonbased trust, and showed themselves as able to go beyond that "warm glow" and to identify the properties that count. These include Professionalism, and Influence, but neither the Social awareness and Innovation nor Transparency.
Who perceived the bank as trustworthy?
We now turn to examine how the characteristics of the respondents, such as their independent from the political system, transparent, innovative and socially aware.
<Figure 2: Clusters means>
Next, we examined how independent variables affect the likelihood of belonging to each cluster. To cope with this classification problem, we used Chi-Squared Automatic Interaction Detection (CHAID, alpha to split<0.1) -an algorithm used for constructing non-binary decision trees, which relies on the Chi-square test to determine the best split at each step. The CHAID algorithm effectively yields many multi-way frequency tables and therefore is suitable for large datasets (StatSoft, Inc. 2013) .
Variables that the algorithm could use for the classification were socio-economic status We endeavored to identify those people who have a more positive view of the Central Bank. Respondents cluster in two groups: one cluster tends to view the Central Bank as a generally trustworthy institution, able to function independently from the political system, transparent, innovative and socially aware; compared to the second cluster of respondents. Of the demographic factors we collected, two were the most predictive of a positive view: exposure to economic media and socio-economic status (SES). Belonging to a higher SES and being regularly exposed to economic information in the media were independently associated with a positive view of the Central Bank.
The influence of the media is consistent with Lamla & Lein (2010) , who found that the media have power to change inflationary expectations. Media reports on the Bank of Israel tend to be positive, and so it is unsurprising that the media effect in our survey is positive. In 2010, The Bank of Israel used image analysis to measure changes in the Bank's reputation (Bank of Israel, internal unpublished report). Sixty-five percent of the press reports had a positive tone, as did 56% of the online reports, whereas only 15% of all reports were negative.
Factor analysis of the public perception of the bank yielded three main factors:
professionalism ( Predictions of the Central Bank are considered credible to the extent that the Bank is perceived as an independent institution, and as powerful, influential and relevant. This interpretation is further strengthened by our mediation analysis: trustworthiness ("General Trust") mediates only the effect of professionalism on credibility (CBCA).
Influence also affects credibility (CBCA), but trustworthiness does not mediate this effect. The other two perception factors, Social awareness and Innovation and Transparency, while they affect trustworthiness and have a relatively high correlation with professionalism, do not affect the extra (unique) credit given to the CB.
High correlations between the perception aspects, and between perception aspects and General trust, suggest that the public perception of the Central Bank involves a halo effect. The halo effect is a cognitive bias in which judgments are influenced by overall impressions without differentiating the details. This is a manifestation of implicit trust (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010) , an associative and unanalyzed reaction to the Bank. In contrast, expectations concerning the credibility of the CB predictions (Geraats, 2009; Salle, 2013) , our findings indicate that transparency, much stressed by central bankers, is not perceived by the general public as relevant to the Bank's ultimate success in achieving its goals.
The Central Bank seeks to manage private expectations in order to achieve a better stabilization of both inflation and economic activity. For the general public, only the core meaning of transparency (informing the public of its goals and predictions, Salle 2013) is relevant. The public takes in that information, and uses heuristics to decide whether to credit it. Those heuristics do not include the Bank's reasoning and motivations, as the public is incapable of understanding them. Instead, it judges whether to believe that the goals will be achieved and the predictions will materialize on the basis of its appraisal of the bank's "willingness and competence" (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010 ) -whether it is genuinely willing and able to achieve them.
The situation is of course very different when it comes to economic experts. To them, openness about the basis for the Bank's pronouncements is not a potential heuristic marker of a well-behaved institution: it constitutes a source of information.
The opportunity to pore over the considerations underlying the decisions and predictions of the CB enables experts to evaluate them professionally, and to conclude rationally whether to accept them. Note: The figures represent the probability of belonging to cluster 1. The main differences between the two clusters is income and the level of exposure to economic media channels: Individuals who unexposed to economic media, have a less positive perception of the bank of Israel -out of those (111), 46 belong to cluster 1, 41%. Respondents with higher than average income, who consistently exposed to economic media, perceive the bank as highly trustworthy -out of those (61), 50 belong to cluster 1, 82%.
